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Trans1 people’s rights are systematically violated in the many parts of the world. The 
life expectancy of a trans woman in Latin America is less that 35 years old.2  As a result of 
marginalisation, violence and discrimination, in Europe, one in four trans people has attempted 
suicide at least once in their lifetime.3 In the Asia Pacific region, the vast majority of trans people 
don’t have access to basic healthcare.4 In Southern Africa, trans people unable to change their 
documents are often suspected of identity fraud and unable to open bank accounts or seek 
employment.5 Yet, until recently, trans rights were considered a controversial issue. Today, 
trans rights violations continue to be severely underestimated by most human rights bodies, 
and are classified under the right to private life. The analysis in the following chapters focuses 
on human rights violations stemming from laws and policies restricting or prohibiting access to 
legal gender recognition (LGR).  
The aim of the paper is to shift the focus away from the right to private life, and highlight 
how restrictive policies induce mental and physical suffering that amounts to Cruel and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment (CIDT). This dissertation focuses on the violations arising from the 
impossibility to legally and medically transition and on the prohibitive requirements imposed on 
trans people by the state when they wish to undergo gender transition. The first chapter will 
provide an overview of the literature highlighting the gendered structures in law and society, 
and how those influence human right bodies’ approach to trans rights. The second chapter 
provides an overview of human rights bodies’ case law on trans issues, and a criticism of such 
case law. The third chapter outlines the definition of CIDT, and the severity of treatment required 
to reach such threshold. The last and fourth chapter analyses trans rights violations stemming 
from prohibition of LGR and impositions prohibitive requirements to obtain LGR. 
 
                                                 
1 This paper will use the term ‘trans’ as an umbrella term encompassing transgender, transsexual and 
other people who may not identify with the sex they have been assigned at birth such as people who 
identify as Two Spirit, Fa’afaine and others. 
2  “Violence against LGBTI persons in the Americas” OAS/Ser.L/V/II.rev.1 (IACHR, 2015), p.15 
3 Adam Smiley et al. “Over diagnosed but underserved. Trans healthcare in Georgia, Poland, Serbia, 
Spain and Sweden: trans health survey” (Transgender Europe 2018), p.21 
4 “Blueprint for the provision of comprehensive care for trans people and trans communities in Asia and 
the Pacific” (Asia Pacific Trans Network., 2015), p.2 
5 Usha Jugroop “Laws and Policies Affecting Transgender Persons in Southern Africa” (Southern Africa 




Chapter 1: Trans people’s interaction with the State 
This chapter provides the theoretical background necessary to understand and 
analyse why basic rights of transgender people are often not recognised by human rights 
institutions. 
 
1.a. Trans identities  
In every country, to transcribe a birth, the new-born’s sex has to be declared as either 
female or male.6 Such classification in a binary registration system, is the prerequisite to legal 
recognition of the new-born.   The sex assigned at birth has many permanent consequences 
throughout a person’s life. Many states do not allow trans people to legally transition, and the 
vast majority of the countries that do allow legal gender recognition (LGR), require invasive 
medical interventions and lengthy administrative or judicial processes.7 Such processes show 
how sex and gender are often conceived as natural and biologically determined. However, 
these are “socially constructed systems of classification, changing over time and varying across 
cultures.”8 Sex continues to be understood by most legal systems and scholarship in terms of 
biological differences between male and female.9 Such strictly binary categorisation however 
does not reflect the more diverse biological reality, and is merely a legal construct.10 This 
system, for example, ignores the existence of intersex individuals and forces them in binary sex 
categories. Gender on the other hand, is understood to represent the cultural and social 
constructions of masculinity and femininity.11 The CESCR defines gender as referring to the 
“cultural expectations and assumptions about the behaviour, attitudes, personality traits, and 
physical and intellectual capacities of men and women, based solely on their identity as men 
                                                 
6 Daminan A. Gonzales-Salzberg, “The accepted transsexual and the absent transgender: a queer 
reading of the regulation of sex/gender by the European Court of Human Rights” American University 
International Law Review (2014,29) 
7 Zhan Chiam et al. “Trans legal mapping report: recognition before the law” (ILGA,2016) 
8 Laurel Westbrook “Transforming the sex/gender/sexuality system” in Nancy L. Fischer and Steven 
Seidman (eds) “Introducing the New Sexuality Studies” (Routledge, 2016), p. 33 
9 Daminan A. Gonzales-Salzberg, “The accepted transsexual and the absent transgender: a queer 
reading of the regulation of sex/gender by the European Court of Human Rights” American University 
International Law Review (2014,29) 
10 Wendy O’Brien “Can International Human Rights Law accommodate bodily diversity?” Human Rights 
Law Review (2015,15), p. 5 
11 Lars D. Christiansen, Nancy L. Fisscher “Working in the (social) Construction zone” in Nancy L. 
Fischer and Steven Seidman (eds) Introducing the New Sexuality Studies (Routledge, 2016), p.9  
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or women.”12 While this approach is strictly binary, it reflects how International Human Rights 
Law (IHRL) currently understands the social and cultural construction of gender.  
A correct understanding of the differentiation between sex and gender is fundamental 
when discussing trans rights. Trans persons are those individuals whose gender identity does 
not match with the sex they have been assigned at birth. Gender identity is each person’s 
deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with 
the sex assigned at birth, including the sense of the body and other expressions of gender, 
including dress, speech and mannerism.13 The word ‘trans’ is a western and modern term, 
originally based on a medical categorisation of gender identities. Many cultures around the 
world adopt different words to describe gender non-conformity in the context of their cultures.14 
 
1.b Gender structures in society 
To have a better understanding of why trans people are systematically discriminated, 
trans people need to be contextualised in a wider gender structure. The patriarchal structure of 
today’s society is one of the main factors that has led to the systematic discrimination of trans 
people. Feminist legal scholars argue that men’s long-term domination of domestic and 
international institutions led to the perception that men’s issues are human rights issues, while 
women’s issues are marginal.15 Together with women’s issues, LGBTI16 people’s needs and 
issues remain marginal to the human rights discourse. Such structure of oppression is 
maintained by the exclusion of women and LGBTI people from the institutions where human 
rights decisions are made.17 Celina Romany argues that States are ‘jurisprudentially male’. This 
is due to the fact that they take a male standpoint of power in society, thus continuing to 
                                                 
12 CESCR general comment 16 §14 
13 “The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation 
to sexual orientation and gender identity” International Commission of Jurists (2007), p.6 
14 “Injustice exposed: the criminalisation of transgender people and its impact” The Human Dignity Trust 
(2019), p.12 
15 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, Shelley Wright “Feminist approaches to international law” The 
American Journal of International Law (1991,85), p. 625 
16 The choice to use the acronym LGBTI instead of LGBTQ+, is due to its use in a variety of 
international legal documents and the necessity to include Intersex people. 
17 Hilary Charlesworth “What are Women’s International Human Rights?” in Rebecca J. Cook (ed) 




perpetrate gender relations of subordination.18 As a result, the State and its legal system cannot 
be considered genderless.19 While gender dynamics and the specific mechanisms through 
which oppression of women and LGBTI people are perpetrated may be culturally specific, 
gender inequality is a global system with both universal and culture-specific repercussions.20 
It is fundamental to acknowledge the gendered nature of domestic and international 
institutions to analyse how human rights bodies have adjudicated trans rights cases.21 Feminist 
legal scholars have exposed the gendered structure of international law and its reliance on the 
binary logic of male self and female other.22 Early feminist scholars challenged the assumption 
in IHRL in which women were portrayed as passive objects of the law rather than active 
subjects, and the assumption that the legal ‘standard’ is male.23  
The human rights law framework made it possible to start challenging the assumed 
hierarchy of gender, but left the assumption of dualistic binary genders unquestioned and 
fundamentally unchallenged.24 While feminist movements challenged the biological 
determinism of ‘sex’ and adopted the language of socially constructed gender roles, usually, to 
speak of gender in international law, is to speak of women.25 Dianne Otto argues that this is a 
result of the fact that “certain feminists are afraid that fully disengaging sex/gender from its 
biological moorings will mean the loss of the precarious spaces that have been carved out for 
attention to be paid to women’s rights issues.”26 Otto further argues that CEDAW reinforces 
gender binarism in IHRL by recognising women and men as the only two possible genders in 
                                                 
18 Celina Romany “State responsibility goes private: A feminist critique of the public/private distinction in 
International Human Rights Law” in Rebecca J. Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and 
International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p.93 
19 Catherine A. McKinnon “Are women human? And other international dialogues” (Harvard University 
Press, 2006), p.13 
20 Catherine A. McKinnon “Are women human? And other international dialogues” (Harvard University 
Press, 2006), p.13 
21 Celina Romany “State responsibility goes private: A feminist critique of the public/private distinction in 
International Human Rights Law” in Rebecca J. Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and 
International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p.93 
22 Wendy O’Brien “Can International Human Rights Law accommodate bodily diversity?” Human Rights 
Law Review (2015, 15), p.4  
23 Dianne Otto “International Human Rights Law: Rethinking the sex/gender dualism” in Margaret 
Davies, Vanessa E. Munro (eds) The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Ashgate, 
2013) 
24 Dianne Otto “Queering gender [identity] in International Law” Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2015, 
33), p.302 
25 Wendy O’Brien “Can International Human Rights Law accommodate bodily diversity?” Human Rights 
Law Review (2015, 15), p.13 
26 Dianne Otto “International Human Rights Law: Rethinking sex/gender dualism” in Margaret Davies, 
Vaness E. Munro (eds) The Ashgate Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Ashgate, 2013), p. 205 
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the international legal framework.27 As a result of this process and of widespread homo-
transphobia, human rights bodies have ignored LGBTI rights until the 1990s, and the discourse 
surrounding the social construction of gender in human rights remained constricted to a binary 
gender model. Human rights institutions haven’t fully understood that gender is socially and 
culturally constructed, and therefore failed to acknowledge the existence and rights of trans, 
gender non-conforming and intersex individuals.28  
McKinnon argues that “legally, one is less than human when one’s violations do not 
violate human rights that are recognised […] when and where this denial is overcome and rights 
against the extreme and the normal are recognised, the treatment is defined as inhuman and 
the victims human.”29 This process recognition has just begun for trans people. Women’s 
oppression is maintained through a patriarchal model that shapes domestic and international 
institutions, trans people’s oppression is maintained through a cis-normative30 binary gender 
model. This model rigidly classifies both sex and gender in two distinctive and separate 
categories and therefore legitimises the institutional discrimination of trans, gender non-
conforming and intersex individuals.31 The oppression of trans and gender non-conforming 
people has been perpetrated through both formal policies such as criminalisation and 
pathologisation, and informal policies of tolerance of discrimination and exclusion. Many states 
have either laws that criminalise the expression or activities of trans and gender-diverse people, 
or general laws used by state officials to target trans people.32 Such laws include the prohibition 
of cross-dressing, the criminalisation of homosexuality and general public order, misdemeanour 
and vagrancy laws.33 At the time of writing, approximately 15 countries impose criminal 
sanctions against persons whose gender expression does not align with their sex assigned at 
                                                 
27 Dianne Otto “Queering gender [identity] in international law” Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2015, 
33), p.303 
28 Wendy O’Brien “Can International Human Rights Law accommodate bodily diversity?” Human Rights 
Law Review (2015, 15), p.8 
29 Catherine McKinnon “Are women human? And other international dialogues” (Harvard University 
Press, 2006), p.2 
30 Cisgender is the opposite of transgender and is a term used to define all people whose gender 
identity correspond to the sex they have been assigned at birth. 
31 Silvan Angius, Christa Tobler “Trans and Intersex people discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender 
identity and gender expression” European Commission Directorate-General for Justice (2011), p.13 
32 “Injustice exposed: the criminalisation of transgender people and its impact” The Human Dignity Trust 
(2019), p.14 




birth, and 69 countries criminalise homosexuality.34 Many other countries used to have such 
laws and continue to embrace discriminating policies today. 
Gender stereotypes and prejudices are particularly resilient, pervasive and persistent, 
and continue to affect societal attitudes towards trans people.35 Following the decriminalisation 
homosexuality and cross-dressing in several countries throughout the 1970s, being trans has 
been classified as a mental and behavioural disease. The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
develops the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), upon which most states base their 
medical protocols.  In 1980, the ICD introduced ‘transsexualism’ and other ‘gender identity 
disorders’ in its chapter on ‘mental and behavioural disorders’.36 Trans activists have been 
challenging the reduction of trans identities to a medicalised narrative in the early 1990s.37 
Trans identities however, have only been depathologised by the WHO in late 2018 with the 
entry into force of the ICD-11. As a result of the prolonged pathologisation of trans identities, 
most countries continue to work under the pathologising model. Contextually, homosexuality 
was also classified as a mental and behavioural disease by the WHO, and de-classified in 
1973.38 As it can be deduced from a reflection on the pathologisation of homosexuality and a 
comparison with the current situation, the pathologisation of trans individuals has no clinical 
benefit, and continues to perpetrate discrimination. While the problematic nature of 
pathologisation of trans people is overlooked by IHRL, such pathologisation perpetrates the 
idea that being trans is a mental illness.39 The dehumanising effects of both the criminalisation 
and the pathologisation of trans identities has severe consequences on trans people’s 
enjoyment of human rights, and normalise discrimination. Rebecca Cook argues that in order 
to classify something as a human rights concern or violation, a specific harm against a person 
or a group must be identified and named.40 However, international institutions have sanctioned 
                                                 
34 Injustice exposed: the criminalisation of transgender people and its impact” The Human Dignity Trust 
(2019), p.13 
35 Rebecca J. Cook, Simone Cusack “Gender Stereotyping” (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 
p.22 
36 Maria Elisa Castro-Peranza et al. “Gender identity: the human right to depathologization” International 
Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (2019, 16), p. 3 
37 Andrew Sharpe “Transgender Jurisprudence, dysphoric bodies of law” (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
2002), p. 35 
38 Maria Elisa Castro-Peranza et al. “Gender identity: the human right to depathologization” International 
Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (2019, 16), p. 3 
39 Wendy O’Brien “Can International Human Rights Law accommodate bodily diversity?” Human Rights 
Law Review (2015, 15), p. 5 




the pathologisation of trans people, and have therefore hindered the process of identification of 
harm caused by prohibitive requirements for Legal Gender Recognition (LGR) such as coerced 
sterilisation and other medical treatments.  
Thus, it becomes clear that international institutions are also deeply gendered and 
reflect structural inequalities present in the domestic system.41 Violation of trans people’s 
human rights have been formally recognised for the first time by a UN mechanism in 2001,42 
and by the ECtHR in 2002.43 The IACtHR only recognised them in 2017.44 Such delay in the 
recognition of trans rights violation is descriptive of the approach that most human rights 
institutions have maintained towards trans people for a long time.  As a result of pathologisation, 
trans people do not enjoy full equality before the law in any country of the world. McKinnon 
argues that “becoming a human in both the legal and lived sense is a social, legal and political 
process. It requires prohibiting or otherwise delegitimising all acts by which human beings as 
such are violated.”45 To achieve this goal for trans people, the current pathologising model has 
to be dismantled. If one’s core identity is considered a mental and behavioural illness, their full 
humanity is not recognised. As it will be argued in the following chapters, this approach 
continues to hold significant influence on States and human rights bodies. 
 
Chapter 2: Trans people’s interaction with the law 
This chapter provides an overview of how human rights bodies have dealt with discriminatory 
state policies that regulate medical and legal gender transitions. Today trans people are 
subjected to discriminatory provisions in most countries.46 When States prohibit Legal Gender 
Recognition (LGR) or impose prohibitive medical and administrative requirements, they violate 
                                                 
41 Celina Romany “State responsibility goes private: A feminist critique of the public/private distinction in 
International Human Rights Law” in Rebecca J. Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and 
International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), p.93 
42 Dianne Otto “Queering gender [identity] in international law” Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2015, 
33), p.308 
43 “Gender Identity Issues factsheet” European Court of Human Rights Press Unit (2019)  
44 Advisory Opinon OC-24/17 (IACtHR, 2017) 
45 Catherine A. McKinnn “Are women human? And other international dialogues” (Harvard University 
Press, 2006), p.2 
46 Rebecca Lee “Forced sterilisation and mandatory divorce: how a majority of Council of Europe 
member states’ laws regarding gender identity violate the internationally and regionally established 
human rights of trans people” Berkeley Journal of International Law (33, 2015), p.117 
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trans people’s right to moral and physical integrity.47 Most of the countries that allow LGR, 
continue to impose such prohibitive requirements.48  
As a result of the deeply gendered structure of international law, the UN human rights 
mechanisms did not acknowledge in any significant way human rights violations on the basis 
of gender identity until the late 1990s.49 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights published 
its first judgement on LGBT rights in 2012,50 and has not yet adjudicated a case on trans rights, 
despite the fact that most States under its jurisdiction have deeply discriminatory policies 
towards trans people. In 2017, however, it published an advisory opinion on Costa Rica with 
highly progressive views on trans issues.51 The ECtHR started to adjudicate transgender cases 
concerning the right to obtain LGR in the early 2000s.52 The African system continues to remain 
silent on transgender issues, and is therefore not incorporated in the main analysis.53  
In the past thirty years, trans rights have been litigated and advocated at the 
international level mostly through the right to private life. This issue can be explained through 
the public/private divide. According to this theory, women’s issues are relegated to the private 
sphere, where the State does not intervene and allows violations to take place unhindered. 
Celina Romany argued that the dichotomisation of the public and private sphere cripples 
women’s citizenship and impairs their participation in democratic life.54 The same can be said 
for trans people. Non-recognition of one’s gender identity by the state and systematic 
discrimination inhibit trans people’s recognition as persons with equal rights before the law. 
Therefore, both their recognition as legal subjects having human right, and their participation in 
the public life are impaired. Private life presupposes the non-intervention of the state, since it 
is understood to be a self-regulated arena and a space of non-intervention by the State.55 
However, as with women’s rights, this border between public and private is highly permeable 
                                                 
47 Silvan Angius, Christa Tobler “trans and intersex people: discrimination on the grounds of sex, gender 
identity and gender expression” European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice (2011), p.13 
48 UNGA Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/19/41, par. 72 
49 Melanie Bejzyk “Criminalisation on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity: reframing the 
dominant human rights discourse to include freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment” Canadian Journal of Women and the Law (2017, 29), p.382 
50 Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Case 12.502 (IACtHR, 2012)  
51 Advisory Opinon OC-24/17 (IACtHR, 2017) 
52 ECHR “Gender Identity factsheet” (Council of Europe, 2019) available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Gender_identity_ENG.pdf accessed on 30 August 2019 
53 Zhan Chiam et al. “Trans legal mapping report: recognition before the law” (ILGA, 2016), p.17  
54 Celina Romany in Rebecca Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women, p.94  
55Ciara O’Connel What private life means for women (Intersentia, 2015), p. 636 
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when it comes to control of disempowered communities and women’s reproductive lives.56 As 
it will be seen towards the end of this chapter, the right to private life has failed to protect trans 
people from violations stemming from discriminatory and pathologising policies regulating trans 
livelihoods. While the arguments under the right to private life have been beneficial to the 
advancement of trans rights, they are also limited in scope and fail to recognise the severity of 
certain violations and states’ positive obligation towards trans people.  
 
2.a The right to private life 
The right to private life is enshrined in all the main Civil and Political rights conventions, 
and protects individuals from unlawful or arbitrary interferences with their family, home or 
correspondence.57 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) observed that the right to privacy also 
refers “to the sphere of a person’s life in which he or she can freely express his or her identity, 
be it by entering into relationships with others or alone.”58 This includes a person’s gender 
identity. The definition of the right to private life as included in the ICCPR, IACHR and ECtHR 
protects the ‘family, home and correspondence’. However, it can be deduced that such list is 
not exhaustive, but indicative of the scopes of the right to private life. Amongst others, the right 
to private life has a decisional, relational and zonal scope. 59 Trans rights have been adjudicated 
under each of these three types of privacy.60  
Decisional privacy concerns the right to make decisions about one’s own life, including 
medical decisions.61 It also protects a person’s right to make decisions concerning their medical 
treatment, including psychiatric treatment.62 In Toonen v. Australia, the HRC used this 
argument to argue that the right to privacy includes an adult’s intimate  decision to engage in 
sexual conducts with a same sex partner.63 Decisional privacy includes decisions about how to 
                                                 
56 Donna Sullivan The Public/private distinction in international human rights law, p. 128 
57 see for example International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 171, art. 17, 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1951), art.8 
58 A.R. Coeriel and M.A.R. Aurik v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 453/1991 (HRC, 1994), par. 
10.2 
59 “Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Practitioners’ Guide n. 4” 
International Commission of Jurists (2009), p.52 
60 “Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Practitioners’ Guide n. 4” 
International Commission of Jurists (2009), p.52 
61 Jonathan Herring and P.L. Chau ‘My body, your body, our bodies’ in A.M. Viens (ed) The Right to 
bodily integrity (Ashgate, 2014), p.52 
62 Herczegalvy v. Austria (2012) ECtHR, Case 10533/83, par. 83-86 
63 “Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Practitioners’ Guide n. 4” 
(International Commission of Jurists, 2009), p.47 
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transition and which gender-affirming medical treatment to seek. Violations on the basis of 
decisional privacy have been found by human rights bodies when States require trans people 
to undergo sterilisation,64 and/or divorce their spouse to obtain LGR.65 
Relational privacy concerns the right to establish and develop relationships with others.66 The 
ECtHR, in this regard stated that “Elements such as gender identity or identification, names, 
sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by [the right to private 
life].”67  The first human rights cases concerning the right to obtain LGR, were adjudicated by 
the ECtHR under the relational privacy doctrine.68 
Zonal privacy originally from State interferences in a person’s home, but developed to 
include actions such as invasive body searches. The IACtHR in X and Y v. Argentina, a case 
concerning invasive body searches to prison visitors, stated that “the right to privacy guarantees 
that each individual has a sphere into which no one can intrude, a zone which is wholly one’s 
own. In this sense, various guarantees throughout the [American] convention which protect the 
sanctity of the person create zones of privacy.”69 The right to bodily integrity stems from the 
concept of zonal privacy that is every definition of the right to private life and from the 
philosophical idea of ownership of one’s body and its inviolability.70 The right to bodily integrity 
is protected by both the right private life and the right to be free from CIDT, depending on the 
severity of the violation.71 However, the pathologisation of trans people is contrary to this notion, 
since it strips trans people much of the decisional power concerning their identities and bodies. 
 
2.b Human rights bodies and trans people 
This section will analyse how human rights institutions have approached State policies 
that limit and violate trans people’s rights. For the purposes of this dissertation, such violations 
will be classified in two broad categories: prohibition of transition (both de facto and de jure), 
                                                 
64 A.P., Garcon and Nicot v. France, Application n. 79885/12 (ECtHR, 2017), Advisory Opinon OC-24/17 
(IACtHR, 2017) 
65 G. v. Australia, Application n. 2171/2012 (HRC, 2017)  
66 Jill Marshall “Bodily and Moral integrity Rights” in A.M. Viens (ed) The Right to bodily integrity 
(Ashgate, 2014), p.23 
67A.P., Garcon and Nicot v. France, Application n. 79885/12 (ECtHR, 2017), par. 92 
68 see Christine Goodwin v. the UK, Application n.28957/95 (ECtHR, 2002) 
69 X and Y v. Argentina, Case n. 10.506 (IACtHR, 1996), par. 91 
70 Jill Marshall “Bodily and Moral integrity Rights” in A.M. Viens (ed) The Right to bodily integrity 
(Ashgate, 2014), p.8 
71 A.M. Viens “The Right to bodily integrity” (Ashgate, 2014), p. XIII 
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and the imposition of prohibitive requirements (medical and administrative) by State authorities 
in order to complete a gender transition.  
 
i. Prohibition to transition 
Gender identity is a fundamental aspect of a person’s life. Being able to legally and 
medically transition is therefore fundamental for a trans person’s wellbeing. This section deals 
with State policies that make it impossible for trans people to complete a legal transition. When 
transgender people are unable to obtain legal recognition of their preferred gender, they are de 
facto not recognised before the law and they encounter higher levels of discrimination and 
violence as well as many practical difficulties.72 To allow LGR to take place, states have to 
introduce administrative processes in their domestic systems to allow people to ament their 
name and sex assigned at birth.  
The first successful trans rights cases were litigated before the ECtHR in the early 
2000s, and challenged States’ prohibition to change legal sex on documents and birth 
certificates.73 Those first cases aimed at establishing two legal concepts: first, that gender 
identity is a central aspect of a person’s identity and second, that gender identification, name 
and sexual life should be protected from undue State interferences under the right to privacy.74 
While the ECtHR challenged the prohibition to transition through private life, it did so while 
endorsing a highly pathologising discourse. In the early 2000s, the Court was mainly concerned 
with the analysis of  whether the impossibility to change one’s legal sex was proportionate or 
not with regards to the public interest.75 The pathologisation of trans identities on the other hand 
was left unchallenged. This is exemplified by the case of Van Kuck v. Germany, in which the 
Court stated that “given the numerous and painful interventions involved in gender 
reassignment surgery and the level of commitment and conviction required to achieve a change 
in social gender role, it cannot be suggested that there is anything arbitrary or capricious in the 
decision taken by a person to undergo gender reassignment.”76 In 2002, the ECtHR said that 
States had to provide trans people with the possibility of obtaining LGR since “In the twenty first 
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century the right of transsexuals to personal development and to physical and moral security 
[…] cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy”.77 Previously, trans rights were considered 
too controversial. From these cases onwards, human rights bodies continued to use the right 
to private life.78 While this argument may have been useful at the beginning, it has also hindered 
human rights bodies from understanding the mental suffering imposed on trans people by 
pathologisation. 
In the concluding observations on the UK and Ireland, the HRC urged States to 
recognise the right of transgender people to legally change their gender.79 In those concluding 
observations, the HRC framed it under the right to private life.80 
In the early cases ECtHR and the HRC adopted similar reasoning to that used few years before 
in the cases challenging the criminalisation of homosexuality in Dudgeon v. the UK and Toonen 
v. Australia.81 Dudgeon and Toonen suffered a disproportionate harm by living in fear of being 
arrested for their homosexuality. In the case of trans rights, the reasoning revolved around the 
disproportionality of the harm suffered by trans individuals as a result of having to declare their 
sex assigned at birth, compared to the public interest of allowing trans people to transition. The 
harm stems from exposure to discrimination and violence, lack of access to services and denial 
of one’s recognition before the law. The ECtHR stated that “the stress and alienation arising 
from a discordance between the position in society assumed by a post-operative transsexual 
and the status imposed by law which refuses to recognise the change in gender cannot […] be 
regarded as a minor inconvenience arising from a formality.”82 The Court found that the UK had 
violated the applicant’s right to private life by not allowing her to amend her birth certificate.83 
The reasoning was based on the interference of her private life that caused discrimination and 
harm.  
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Some states theoretically allow trans people to transition, but de facto have not adopted 
the necessary policies to make this possible. Trans people’s right to transition should be not 
only theoretical, but also practical and enforceable. In Lithuania the State adopted a law 
allowing transgender people to legally change their documents if sterilised, but failed to 
implement a policy allowing trans people to undergo the required surgery. The ECtHR found a 
violation of the right to private life since the legislative gap “left the applicant in a situation of 
distressing uncertainty vis-à-vis his private life and the recognition of his true identity.”84 A 
similar violation was found in the case of Y.Y. v. Turkey, where the State failed to implement a 
system that de facto allowed trans people to access medical and legal transition.85  
While both the ECtHR and HRC recognised some form of suffering induced by States 
when they prohibit trans people to transition, framing it as a violation of the right to private life 
demonstrates a lack of understanding of the severity of the consequences of such prohibition. 
The IACtHR in its recent Advisory Opinion on Costa Rica, recognised that gender identity is 
“both an integral and a determining component of the personal identity of the individual, [and] 
its recognition by the State is critical to ensuring that transgender persons can fully enjoy all 
human rights.”86 The Court then proceeded to recognise that the lack of recognition may amount 
to violations of the right to be free from CIDT and the right to be recognised before the law. The 
Advisory Opinion from 2017 is the first and only time that the IACtHR has expressed its views 
on trans rights. Even though several states under its jurisdiction continue to prohibit trans 
people to transition, a case concerning this issue has never successfully reached the Court.87  
As will be argued in chapter 4, the approach adopted by most human rights institutions fails to 
recognise the suffering imposed on trans people when not allowing them to transition.  
 
ii.  Prohibitive requirements 
Some states recognize the gender identity of trans persons, but establish requirements 
for such recognition that further their violate human rights.88 Such requirements vary from state 
to state, but may include sterilisation, divorce and court mandated invasive medical exams. In 
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additional to the requirements that directly lead to violations, other requirements unduly expose 
trans people to violence and discrimination. This section will examine how human rights bodes 
have dealt with this issue.  
 
a. Sterilisation and other medical requirements 
A large number of countries require trans individuals to undergo a sterilisation 
procedure in order to be able to change their legal sex and name. Some human rights bodies 
have recently that the suffering imposed on trans people as a result of coerced sterilisation may 
amount to CIDT. This is a result of a long process not based on trans people’s rights, but rather 
on women’s rights. Feminist scholars have argued for a long time to classify enforced 
sterilisation as a violation of CIDT, given the severity of violations of women’s right to moral and 
bodily integrity in cases of coerced sterilisation.89 The classification of sterilisation as CIDT 
therefore is not the result of a recognition of the suffering imposed on trans people by 
pathologising their identities, but rather the application of a pre-existing reasoning to trans 
cases. Otherwise, other coercive medical treatments would have been classified as CIDT 
alongside sterilisation. As seen in section b of this chapter, this is not the case. 
The Special Rapporteur on Torture stated that “medical treatments of an intrusive and 
irreversible nature, when lacking a therapeutic purpose, may constitute torture or ill-treatment 
when enforced or administered without free and informed consent of the person concerned.”90 
He further acknowledged that in many countries transgender persons are required to undergo 
often unwanted sterilisation surgeries to be recognised as their preferred gender, and called 
states to States to outlaw forced or coerced sterilisation in all circumstances.91 In the concluding 
observation on Hong Kong, UNCAT expressed concerns about the fact that transgender 
persons had to undergo sterilisation in order to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity.92 
The Committee urged Hong Kong to take the necessary legislative and administrative 
measures “to guarantee respect for the autonomy and psychological integrity of transgender 
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persons […] by removing abusive preconditions for the legal recognition of the gender identity 
of transgender persons, such as sterilisation”93 The HRC in the communications did not find a 
violation of the right to be free from CIDT. The HRC, in its concluding observation on Australia 
argued that the state should “take measures necessary to remove surgery and marital status 
requirements for sex change on births, deaths and marriage certificates.”94 In the concluding 
observations on the Republic of Korea, the HRC stated that in order to be in compliance with 
the right to private life, the restrictive requirements for legal gender reassignment should be 
modified.95 Currently, in the Republic of Korea in order to legally transition, one is required to 
undergo gender reassignment surgery, and therefore sterilisation.96 
The Special Rapporteur on Torture reinforced the idea that coerced sterilization 
amounts to CIDT and stated that “forced or otherwise involuntary gender reassignment surgery, 
sterilization or other coercive procedures […] are rooted in discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity, violate the rights to physical integrity and self- determination of 
individuals and amount to ill-treatment or torture.97 The IACtHR stated that “subjecting the 
recognition of a transgender person’s gender identity to an undesired surgical intervention or 
sterilisation would mean conditioning the full exercise of several rights, including the rights to 
privacy, and to choose freely the options and circumstances that give a meaning to his or her 
existence, and would lead to the refusal of the full and effective enjoyment of the right to 
personal integrity.”98 It classifies personal integrity under the right to be free from CIDT. The 
Court recalled that the right to personal integrity includes the right to be free from inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and argued that the procedures for the rectification of one’s gender 
“should not require evidence of surgery and/or hormonal therapy.”99 In its analysis, the IACtHR 
therefore recognised the harm provoked to trans individuals when required to undergo not only 
a sterilisation procedure, but also a medical procedures. The ECtHR on the other hand does 
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not recognise that sterilisation amounts to CIDT and stated that “medical treatment cannot be 
considered to be the subject of genuine consent when the fact of not submitting to it deprives 
the person concerned of the full exercise of his or her gender identity and personal 
development”100 The Court recognised that the sterilisation requirement violated the right to 
private life and full exercise of their right to respect for physical integrity as protected also by 
article 3 of the ECtHR.101 However, it then proceeded to state that the sterilisation requirement 
only violated the right to private life of transgender individuals without providing a detailed 
analysis of the reasons for rejecting such argument.102 The ECtHR therefore continues to 
endorse the pathologising model. In particular, the Court noted that transsexualism featured in 
the chapter of ‘Mental and Behavioural disorders’ of the ICD and that “the requirement to obtain 
a prior psychiatric diagnosis [did] not directly affect individuals’ physical integrity”103 while it did 
not mention psychological integrity. In the same case, the Court argues that the French state 
did not violate the Convention by ordering an expert medical assessment entailing intimate 
genital examination as a condition to legally change documents.104 The ECtHR has not 
contested the pathologisation of transgender identities or found a violation of the right to private 
life or of the right to be free from CIDT concerning the requirement of a psychiatric diagnosis 
and other medical examinations.  
  
b. Legal proceedings and other administrative requirements 
States that allow legal gender change, have to create a legal or administrative procedure to 
change the legal sex on a person’s birth certificate or identity documents. Most states impose 
on trans people both medical treatment requirements and administrative requirements. The 
specific act of changing one’s legal sex can be administrative or judicial. Some of the 
requirements to access legal transition have been found to violate trans people’s rights. In many 
countries, trans people are required to divorce their spouse in order to change their birth 
certificate. In 2011, the HRC found that such requirement is not proportionate or necessary, 
and therefore in violation of the trans people’s right to private life.105 The ECtHR in the past has 
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granted states a large margin of appreciation, given the fact that allowing trans people to remain 
married might have given rise to homosexual marriage in a number of countries. Restrictive 
legal requirements are often based and engrained in a pathologising model. In the case of S.V. 
v. Italy, the applicant was required to go to court twice in order to prove that she had fulfilled all 
the medical and judicial requirements. First, she had to obtain permission to undergo 
sterilisation surgery, and secondly after having undergone the sterilisation, to change her 
documents.106 In this case, the ECtHR found that the fact that she had to wait more than two 
years between the two court rulings constituted a violation of the right to privacy.107 Other 
requirements may be a result of states not regulating gender transition. In Poland for example, 
to change their legal sex, trans people have to first undergo sterilising surgery and then they 
have to sue their parents for assigning them the wrong gender at birth. 108 Prohibitive 
requirements for accessing legal transition have mainly been adjudicated under the right to 
private life, even though they often violate trans people’s rights causing significant suffering that 
may amount to CIDT.   
 
iii. Critiques of the private life approach 
The right to private life does not adequately deals with transgender rights for a number of 
reasons. The privacy argument has two main problems: first, it continues to endorse the 
pathologising model, second, it fails to recognise the severity of trans rights’ violations.  
Concerning the effects of the pathologising model, the independent expert on SOGI 
has recently stated that “pathologisation has had a deep impact on public policy, legislation and 
jurisprudence, thus perpetrating all realms of state action in all regions of the world and 
permeating the collective conscience. Eradicating the conception that some forms of gender as 
a pathology from everyday life will be a long and difficult process and […] proactive measures 
will be required to that end.”109 The privacy argument has been criticised by feminist legal 
scholars for fundamentally requiring the non-intervention of the state in the sphere protected by 
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this right.110 In order to effectively advance trans rights, the system that pathologises trans 
people needs to be criticised, identified as a system of oppression and subsequently 
dismantled. The right to privacy as it has been used to protect and enforce trans rights has 
therefore demonstrated to be limited in scope, since it failed to challenge the underlying 
structure of oppression that leads to continuous violations.  
When adjudicating trans rights, human rights bodies have largely accepted and left 
unchallenged a pathologising model, therefore failing to ensure the respect of trans people’s 
physical and moral integrity. Under pathologising systems, trans people who wish to undertake 
gender affirming medical procedures, or change their legal name or gender, are forced to 
accept a mental illness diagnosis, regardless of the state of their mental health.111 By accepting 
and leaving unquestioned the pathologisation of trans people by States, human rights bodies 
fail to recognise that defining gender diversity as an illness is “unfounded, discriminatory and 
without demonstrable clinical utility.”112 The pathologisation of trans persons is one of the root 
causes behind many of the human rights violations trans people face.113 By imposing trans 
people to undergo medical and psychological procedures before LGR, States continue to 
actively violate trans people’s personal autonomy and integrity.114 Such principles are 
fundamental aspects of a person’s bodily and moral integrity and therefore are protected under 
both the right to private life and the right to be free from CIDT. As a result, when human rights 
bodies and institutions fail to challenge the pathologisation of trans people, they are 
disregarding one of the fundamental principles of the right to private life, which they are applying 
in that moment.  
The second problematic aspect under the right to private life, is that such framework 
fails to acknowledge the suffering imposed by states on trans people as a result of their policies. 
As explored in the first chapter, international law is a highly gendered system. As part of such 
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gendered system, human rights bodies discredit and underestimate trans narratives and 
experiences of suffering. Feminist scholars have argued that human rights bodies’ insistence 
in framing women’s rights violations under the right to private life derived from a patriarchal 
system and as a result, it actively denied women’s rights.115 The definition of torture and CIDT 
have therefore been written with a specific understanding of politically motivated torture against 
cisgender heterosexual men.116 Such definitions have excluded for a long time acts of torture 
and CIDT against women, and continue today to exclude acts against trans individuals. 
Feminist legal scholars have engaged in a long battle to have human rights bodies recognise 
female-specific forms of pain and suffering as serious human rights violations. 117 McKinnon 
argues that in the legal framework, men’s suffering has the dignity of politics and is called 
torture, while women as such are not seen as deserving of dignity or power therefore their 
suffering is not called torture.118 The battle to recognise rape as torture stems from this analysis. 
Trans rights are still at the beginning of a similar process, in which trans suffering is not 
recognised as political or severe enough for constituting torture or CIDT. The Special 
Rapporteur on Torture in a recent report stated that “gender stereotypes play a role in 
downplaying the pain and suffering that certain practices inflict on women, girls, and lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender persons”119 While adjudicating trans rights under the right to 
private life, human rights bodies have failed to understand the severity and the consequences 
stemming from prohibition of transition or imposition of prohibitive requirements. By accepting 
and not questioning the pathologising model, human rights institutions have allowed harm to 
be perpetrated. When a person’s core identity is labelled as a mental illness, his or her personal 
integrity are violated to such an extent that it violates the right to be free from CIDT.120  
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Chapter 3: Torture and Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Trans people 
When classified under the right to private life, certain violations of trans people’s rights 
are clearly underestimated. In order to classify those state policies and acts as violating the 
right to be free from CIDT, this chapter will analyse various definitions of cruel and inhuman or 
degrading treatment, and the understanding of human rights bodies of mental suffering. 
 
3.a Definitions 
Currently, there is no universal definition of the scope of inhuman or degrading 
treatment.121 CIDT is usually defined in relation to the act of torture, as they are often protected 
under the same provision. The ICCPR provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”122 The ECHR’s definition extends to both treatment 
and punishments, and similarly does not formally distinguish between the categories of Torture 
and CIDT.123 The HRC has stated that the Covenant does not contain a definition of the 
prohibition of Torture and CIDT, “nor does the Committee consider it necessary to draw up a 
list of prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of punishment 
or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment 
applied.”124 However, in their case-law they sometimes emphasise that a case explicitly 
constitutes torture. The HRC further stated that the prohibition of Torture and CIDT relates not 
only to acts that cause physical pain, but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim. 
125 Indeed, torture is one of the gravest human rights violations, due to the psychological 
consequences it has on victims.126 Under Article 5 of the ACHR, “every person has the right to 
have his physical, mental and moral integrity respected” and “no one shall be subjected to 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”127 Nigel Rodley argued that for the Human 
Rights Commission “the threshold for entry into the scope of torture and ill-treatment was 
‘degrading treatment’, which grossly humiliated a person or drives him [or her] to act against 
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his [or her] will or conscience.”128 The ECtHR stated that a treatment itself is not degrading 
“unless the person concerned has undergone – either in the eyes of others or in his own eyes- 
humiliation or debasement attaining a minimum level of severity.”129 The measure to understand 
which treatments are humiliating or debasing, has both subjective and objective elements. 
The elements of torture and the treatments falling under this category, have generally 
been more precisely defined in international law, than the criteria to define CIDT.130 The most 
widely accepted definition of torture in international law is provided by art. 1 of  UNCAT.131 
Under UNCAT, states also undertake to prevent “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1.”132 Under both 
provisions, the treatment must happen at the hands of or with the acquiescence of state 
officials.  The classification of an act as CIDT or torture remains relevant due to the fact that the 
prohibition on torture constitutes jus cogens, because under UNCAT, the non-refoulement 
principle does not apply to the prohibition of CIDT.133  
Various human rights bodies, including UNCAT, have understood the difference 
between torture and CIDT to lay in the severity of the treatment.134 Under this approach, torture 
would consist of a particularly aggravated form of pain or suffering, more intense than that 
required for inhuman treatment, and the difference lays both in the severity of the treatment 
and in the purpose.135 However, both Nowak, McArtur and Rodley disagree and argue that “the 
requirement of purpose seems to be the most decisive criterion which distinguishes torture from 
cruel or inhuman treatment.”136 They further state that there is not a severity difference between 
inhuman treatment and torture, while degrading treatment has a lower threshold. Furthermore, 
some forms of physical and psychological ill-treatment may lead to similar psychological 
outcomes as torture, notwithstanding the different legal classification.137  
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Under the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, the degree of 
suffering is not a determining condition for torture, and torture also includes the use of methods 
upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or 
mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish.138 The Special 
Rapporteur on Torture furthermore  stated the threshold between ill-treatment and torture is not 
clear, and that a gender sensitive lens must be adopted in order classify human rights violations 
against LGBT correctly. 139  He added that “the purpose and intent elements of the definition of 
torture are always fulfilled if an act is gender-specific or perpetrated against persons on the 
basis of their sex, gender identity, real or perceived sexual orientation or non-adherence to 
social norms around gender and sexuality.” 140  
Traditionally, the legal elements and definitions of torture have been discussed in 
contexts such as interrogation, punishment or intimidation of a detainee.141 This traditional 
framework is usually also applied  to violations of CIDT, and it involves a male perpetrator and 
a male victim. As an example, Article 7 of the ICCPR, concerning both torture and CIDT, is 
mostly applied in circumstances of abuse within state custody.142 However, the international 
human rights system in the past years has started to adopt an increasingly expansive 
interpretation of the prohibition of torture and CIDT, particularly in the context of gender based 
concerns.143 The change in approach is shown by the fact that the HRC has condemned 
violence against women including domestic violence under Article 7.144 The shift towards an 
inclusion derives from a better understanding of the severity of pain and suffering of gender-
specific treatments.145 Such change started with the understanding of courts that rape may be 
an act of torture on its own. 146 This gendered understanding of pain and suffering by human 
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rights bodies now has to be expanded to issues that emerge from States’ policing of trans 
bodies.  
In order for a state to violate the prohibition of torture and CIDT, there must be a link 
between the State and the pain or suffering experiences.147 Under international human rights 
law, states obligations give rise to a duty to Respect, Protect and Fulfil. Concerning the duty to 
protect, “States fail in their duty to prevent torture and ill-treatment whenever their laws, policies 
or practices perpetrate harmful gender stereotypes in a manner that enables or authorises, 
explicitly or implicitly, prohibited acts to be performed with impunity”148 When an act or a 
treatment derives from a State policy or law regulating gender transitions, State responsibility 
can be easily established. States also have the duty to fulfil, providing services such as 
accessibility to health services or the legal framework to allow trans people to transition. 
 
3.b Analysis of the severity of treatment required 
Trans rights violations arising from the prohibition to transition and/or the imposition of 
prohibitive requirements, result in both physical and mental suffering. To classify such 
treatments as breaches of the right to be free from CIDT, the physical and mental suffering 
standards adopted by human rights bodies have to be analysed. Human rights bodies have 
been slow to fully recognise that mental pain and ill-treatment alone can constitute CIDT, since 
there is a tendency to consider them secondary to physical injuries.149 When classifying an act 
as torture or CIDT, consideration must be given not only to what is done to a person, but also 
to the overall situation and circumstances and individual susceptibilities and vulnerabilities.150  
While conducting the analysis, one of the relevant issues to determine the severity of the act, 
is the personal significance of the psychological maltreatment.151 The ECtHR has defines a 
treatment to be degrading if “it arouses feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of 
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breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance.”152 In Vuolanne v. Finland, the HRC 
stated that the assessment of whether a treatment constitutes ill-treatment, depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the duration and manner of the treatment, its physical and 
mental effects as well as the sex, age and state of health of the victim.153 In cases concerning 
trans people, there are some trans-specific factors that should be taken into account. The 
humiliation in the eyes of the victim or others can derive from treatment that is purely 
psychological or, as described by the ECtHR, has a strong ‘symbolic’ component.154 Humiliation 
has been described as the state in which a person in being ridiculed, unjustly degraded and in 
particular when one’s identity is demeaned or devalued.155 Humiliation refers to the debasement 
of a person’s identity rather than actions.156 To determine whether an act is humiliating or not 
towards a trans person, personal factors and vulnerabilities have to be taken into account.  
Various human rights bodies found that stripping a prisoner naked, depending on one’s 
cultural sensitivities and religion, may constitute CIDT.157 Acting against one’s religion has also 
been found to constitute CIDT. Forced sterilisation often involves the destruction of an essential 
feature of a person’s identity.158 The ECtHR further found that strip-searches by a person of the 
opposite sex can constitute a violation of a person’s integrity and dignity and amount to CIDT, 
since it creates a feeling of humiliation.159 For these reasons, the analysis of the severity of 
treatment cannot be narrowed down to an objective analysis. Concerning the duration of the 
treatment, the ECtHR found that premeditated threat of ill-treatment for a short time, constituted 
CIDT, since the person was in a state of vulnerability.160 There is therefore no established 
minimum time limit for a treatment or an act to be considered in violation of the right to be free 
from CIDT.  
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Physical forms of pain and suffering are more easily understood than psychological 
forms of suffering.161 Some physical treatments or invasion of one’s bodily integrity always 
reach the minimum severity threshold. As will be seen in the next chapter, coerced sterilisation 
is one of such treatments.  
 
Chapter 4. Analysis of Trans rights violations under the right to be free from torture and 
CIDT  
This chapter applies the definition of CIDT to laws and policies prohibiting or imposing 
medical and administrative requirements to obtain LGR. Trans rights are violated in a multitude 
of ways by both State and non-State actors. In the vast majority of the world, being trans is still 
legally considered a pathology.162 As previously seen, the induction of feelings of humiliation 
and degradation are important elements to establish whether a violation of the right to be free 
from CIDT has occurred or not. On this point, the Special Rapporteur on Torture recently stated 
that “discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity may often contribute to 
the process of dehumanisation of the victim, which is often a necessary condition for torture 
and ill-treatment to take place.”163  
Policies that prohibit trans people to legally transition or pathologise their identity and 
require invasive medical procedures, induce feelings of humiliation and degradation, and 
therefore expose trans people to CIDT. It is widely understood that discriminatory legislation 
and pathologisation contribute to an environment in which violence against trans people is 
tacitly permitted or tolerated.164 Contextually, trans people often are seen as less credible by 
law enforcement agency or as not fully entitled to an equal standard of protection due to their 
gender identity.165  
As a result, States violate trans rights in two types of situations. First, they fail to respect 
trans people’s rights when they implement laws and policies that directly violate their rights. 
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Secondly, they violate their rights when failing to protect trans people from violence and 
discrimination at the hands of non-State actors. State responsibility must be established in order 
for a State to be considered responsible for a violation of the right to be free from CIDT. UNCAT, 
in General Comment n. 2, provides that “States bear international responsibility for the acts and 
omissions of their officials and others, including agents, private contractors, and others acting 
in official capacity or acting on behalf of the State, in conjunction with the State, under its 
direction or control or otherwise under colour of law.”166 States can therefore be held 
responsible for violations occurring as a result of the implementation of a law or policy. This 
chapter will focus on the consequences of state policies regulating or prohibiting the medical 
and legal gender transition process.  
 
4.a Prohibition to transition 
Trans persons who are not legally allowed to transition, are de facto not enjoying to right to be 
equally recognised before the law. The term prohibition to transition includes both de jure and 
de facto impossibility to legally transition due to state policies. Even in States that do not allow 
LGR, trans people still do transition medically and socially. Heightened levels of discrimination 
resulting from the impossibility of obtaining LGR, may however deter some trans people from 
socially and medically transitioning, therefore causing even further psychological distress. 
Furthermore, some States may not allow LGR, yet actively provide trans-specific healthcare.167 
Other states have not regulated the legal and medical fields, and as a result leave trans people 
in a juridical vacuum.168  When trans people’s gender is not recognised before the law, they 
face heightened levels of discrimination, exclusion, harassment and violence. States have a 
responsibility to respect trans people’s rights by recognising them before the law. The right to 
equal recognition before the law is a central tenet for other rights and freedoms.169 People who 
transition and whose gender identity is not recognised on their documents, are not equally 
recognised before the law and live in a de facto legal vacuum. The IACHR explicitly recognises 
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the right to recognition as a person before the law in article 3, and the right to a name in article 
18.170 In relation to trans rights, the IACtHR argued that “non-recognition of [gender] identity 
may mean that a person has no legal record of his or her existence, which makes it difficult to 
fully exercise his or her rights.”171 On a similar note, the Independent Expert on SOGI argued 
that “lack of recognition of gender identity may also lead to violations of human rights in other 
contexts, including torture and ill-treatment in medical and detention settings, sexual violence 
and coerced medical treatment.”172 As it will be shown in this section, the lack of recognition 
before the law has consequences on all sphere of one’s life and affects the enjoyment of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights.173  
Not being allowed to legally transition gives rise to two main issues that, alone or 
cumulatively, constitute a violation of the right to be free from CIDT. First, the non-recognition 
before the law per se provokes psychological suffering of a severity that may constitute CIDT. 
Secondly, not being recognised before the law exposes trans people to further discrimination, 
humiliation and violence as well as violations of other human rights.  
 
i. Non-recognition per se: 
Denying the possibility to obtain LGR violates trans people’s moral integrity, since it induces 
feelings of humiliation and psychological suffering. Forcing a person to expose their sex and 
name assigned at birth on a daily basis or leading them not to live their gender, is humiliating 
and breaches trans people’s moral integrity.  Gender identity is recognised by most human 
rights bodies as a fundamental component of a person’s identity.174 In 2012, the UNHCR stated 
that “being compelled to conceal one’s gender identity may also  result in significant 
psychological or other harms.”175 Therefore, if even under refugee law a person cannot be 
asked to conceal their gender identity in order to return to their country of origin and avoid 
persecution, then being forced to conceal one’s gender identity cannot be required in less 
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severe situations.176 Being unable to live in one’s gender has devastating effects on the mental 
health of trans people. While the overall attempted suicide rates for the trans population reach 
20 to 25% in many countries,177 studies clearly show that if a person is able to transition 
(medically, socially and legally), self-harm and suicidal thoughts decrease sharply.178 It is 
important to recognise that trauma and psychological suffering are not inherent to trans people, 
but the result of society’s failure to embrace bodily diversity, constant discrimination and threats 
of violence.179  
Being forced to share an extremely intimate and private information every day for an 
extended period of time, can be considered humiliating. As previously stated, one of the 
elements used to determine if an act is inhuman or degrading, is the assessment of whether 
such act or policy humiliates and debases a victim “in their own eyes or in the eyes of others”.180 
According to the ECtHR, the humiliation inflicted must attain a particular level to constitute 
CIDT. The necessary level is determined by both personal and ‘objective’ factors. 181 Nigel 
Rodley endorses the HRC provision and argues that an act or treatment constitutes ill-treatment 
if a person’s moral and physical integrity are violated and the treatment grossly humiliates a 
person or drives them to act against their will or conscience.182  Not having matching documents 
harms a person’s psychological integrity also because it has the effect of not being recognised 
before the law. On this issue, the IACtHR states that “the lack of juridical personality harms 
human dignity because it is an absolute denial of a person’s condition as a subject of rights, 
and places that person in a vulnerable position owing to the non-observance of his or her rights 
by the State or by private individuals.”183 The lack of legal recognition therefore negates the 
identity of the person to the extent that it provokes a fundamental rupture of state obligations.184 
By denying trans people legal gender recognition, States fail to both respect and protect trans 
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people’s right to moral integrity and their right not to be discriminated on the basis of their 
gender identity. While gender identity is not an internationally protected category, it is protected 
under the open clause included in most non-discrimination provisions.185 
 
ii. Exposure to further human rights violations 
Trans people’s normal social life is severely hindered when States do not allow LGR: without 
matching documents and social security number or bank card with the appropriate name, 
participation in society becomes very difficult.186 Documents that do not reflect one’s gender 
may be seen as not valid by national and foreign authorities.187 In the following paragraphs, 
there are some examples of human rights violations that trans people endure as a result of not 
having matching documents. 
One of the results of being denied LGR is fear of gender based violence and 
transphobic attacks.188  Violent attacks against trans people are common in every region of the 
world. In the American continent, the life expectancy of a trans woman is less than 35 years.189 
In the European Union, one in two trans people are attacked or threatened with violence every 
year.190 In South Asia violence and discrimination against trans people are extremely prevalent 
yet highly under-reported.191 In Southern Africa transgender persons are often harassed and 
prosecuted under general criminal law provisions, and therefore do not seek protection from 
violent attack.192 When trans people are not recognised before the law, they are increasingly 
exposed to violent attacks, and less able or unable to seek protection by state authorities, due 
to fear of further discrimination and accusation of identity fraud.  
Trans people’s rights are also violated in a number of other situations in a manner that 
limits their daily life.  When trans people without matching IDs try to cross a border or board a 
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plane, they are often stopped and questioned by authorities suspecting an identity fraud.193 
When they are questioned by the authorities concerning the un-matching documents, 
authorities often engage in invasive interrogations and/or body searches.194 According to the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, trans people are at heightened risk of ill-treatment during body 
searches.195 When such searches are conducted solely on the basis of discrimination, the risk 
is further heightened. The enjoyment of the right to freedom of movement as enshrined in article 
12 of ICCPR is therefore threatened by the lack of documents reflecting one’s gender.  
When looking for employment, without matching documents, trans people are 
subjected to high levels of discrimination. Trans rights organisations argue that equal access 
to employment is not a reality for trans people across much of the world.196 Having matching 
documents is often a decisive factor when applying for a job, since trans people with un-
matching documents are exposed to institutionalised discrimination. In South-East Asia, a 
region where most trans people are unable to rectify their document, when applying for 
employment, trans people have 60% less chances of gaining employment compared to 
cisgender people.197 In the EU, approximately one in three trans people seeking a job face 
discrimination.198 Endemic employment discrimination leads trans people in a cycle of poverty 
that further exacerbates societal discrimination.  
Access to healthcare is also hindered by lack of matching documents. When trying to 
access public services, including public healthcare, trans people are often met with hostility and 
discrimination.199  While discrimination in healthcare is not only a result of the lack of identity 
documents, in countries where LGR is not possible, discrimination of trans people and 
exclusion from the provision of services is justified by the legal system.200 In the Asia Pacific 
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region for example trans people face significant barriers in exercising their human rights, 
including the right to health: social exclusion and the difficulty in finding employment lead to a 
situation in which trans people often lack an adequate standard of living, and do not access to 
adequate healthcare.201 In South-East Asia, “in all but a handful of countries in the region, trans 
people lack access to basic healthcare.”202 In Latin America and the Caribbean, a report shows 
that healthcare workers and administrative staff often discriminate and perpetrate trans and 
gender non-conforming patients, especially in those countries where trans people are unable 
to obtain matching documents.203 Access to healthcare services is therefore hindered by lack 
of matching identity documents, which provides a justification for discrimination of trans 
people.204 Trans people without matching documents are further hindered from accessing 
social security schemes. General Comment 19 of the CESC, states that a core obligation under 
the right to social security is to “ensure the right of access to social security system or schemes 
on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and 
group.”205 The Committee further argued that “states should remove de facto discrimination on 
prohibited grounds, where individuals are unable to access social security.”206 The IACHR 
further emphasised that the discrimination affecting LGBTI persons places them in a cycle of 
exclusion that tends to culminate in poverty due to lack of services, opportunities and social 
benefits.207  
Non-recognition before the law fundamentally disrupts trans people’s lives on a daily 
basis. For example, in some regions trans people are routinely suspected of identity fraud when 
trying to open a bank account or paying with a credit card reporting a name not matching their 
gender expression.208 The possibility to prove one’s identity when paying with a card, opening 
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a bank account or showing one’s ID when driving are fundamental for integration in society, 
and hindered by lack of matching documents.  
Given the interdependence and indivisibility of rights, grave violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights can lead to a violation civil and political rights.209 In the Xamok Kasek 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the IACtHR argued that the severe deprivation of the right 
to health, underlying determinants of health and right to education, violated the right to life of 
the indigenous community.210 In those cases, the State was deemed responsible for the 
violations because it was aware of the situation, and failed to protect and fulfil its duty 
concerning the indigenous community’s rights. Similarly, numerous violation of trans people’s 
ESC rights may lead to severe mental and physical suffering to such an extent that it reaches 
a level of suffering required to constitute CIDT.  
Trans people also have their rights violated when in detention settings. The risk of being 
exposed to ill-treatment generally rises in cases of deprivation of liberty.211 In such situations, it 
is well established that the proper identification of the individual is the first guarantee to state 
accountability. Equal recognition before the law is therefore a fundamental element for the 
protection from arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment.212 When deprived of 
their liberty, trans people with un-matching documents are often placed in the section of their 
sex assigned at birth.213 In these situations they are at heightened risk of violence, rape and 
sexual victimisation.214 The Special Rapporteur on Torture stated that “humiliating and invasive 
body searches may constitute torture and ill-treatment particularly for transgender 
detainees.”215 The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes has stated that trans prisoners 
are a particularly vulnerable group, to which little attention is paid, despite extensive reports of 
discrimination, humiliation, sexual abuse, rape and other forms of violence, torture and ill-
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treatment.216 Violence, sexual abuse and rape are conducted both by fellow prisoners with the 
acquiescence of the authorities, and at the hands of the guards themselves.217 In particular, 
trans women with un-matching documents are routinely placed in male detention facilities 
without regards to their safety.218 Isolation and solitary confinement for are extensively used as 
a protective measure against violence.219 However, placement in solitary for confinement of 
trans people for long periods of time, constitutes an infringement on the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment.220 Due to space constraints and the large amount of violations, this section 
presented only few examples of violations that occur as a result of non-recognition of trans 
people’s gender identity by the State. These provide an example of the practical effects that the 
non-recognition of identity has on trans people’s enjoyment of basic human rights on a daily 
basis. The impossibility of obtaining legal gender recognition therefore constitutes a violation of 
trans people’s right to be free from Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. 
 
4.b Prohibitive requirements 
Most of the countries that allow gender marker change, do so with medical 
requirements that violate a trans person’s bodily integrity by requiring sterilisation, permanent 
medical changes and/or a psychiatric diagnosis.221 Some states also have administrative and 
judicial requirements such as asking trans people to divorce their spouse, not have dependent 
children and go to court to change their gender marker.222 These requirements have been 
defined as prohibitive since they violate trans people’s moral and physical integrity to a certain 
degree and often require long and expensive administrative proceedings.223 This section 
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argues that such requirements imply coerced medical interventions and therefore constitute 
CIDT.  
Human rights bodies have left the most of the prohibitive requirements that are officially 
sanctioned by the WHO, unquestioned.224 Pathologisation of trans identities creates a 
dependency on a diagnosis for LGR and to access to gender affirming medical procedures.225 
In the past decade, it has become increasingly clear that compulsory compliance with 
psychological and medical requirements to obtain LGR, violate an individual’s right to personal 
autonomy and bodily integrity. 226 When a state requires trans people to undergo a medical 
procedure to have their gender identity recognised before the law, it deprives trans people of 
free consent, because the alternative is non-recognition before the law, which violates CIDT.  
The prohibition of non-consensual medical interventions is one of the core concepts 
entrenched in the prohibition of torture and CIDT. Under Article 7 of the ICCPR, “no one shall 
be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experiments.”227 The Oviedo 
convention on biomedicine further states that “an intervention in the health field may only be 
carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it. This person 
shall be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well 
as on its consequences and risks. The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any 
time.” 228 The Special Rapporteur on the right to health further argues that “informed consent is 
valid only when documented prior to medical procedure and provided voluntarily, meaning 
without coercion, undue influence or misrepresentation. […] Coercion include conditions of 
duress such as fatigue or stress. Undue influence include situations in which the patient 
perceives there may be an unpleasant consequence associated with refusal of consent”229 As 
previously stated, the impossibility of having one’s gender identity recognised before the law 
violates the right to be free from CIDT. Refusal to consent medical interventions and invasive 
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psychiatric evaluations would therefore result in a trans person’s impossibility to be recognised 
before the law. The Special Rapporteur on Torture noted that invasive medical treatments “of 
an intrusive and irreversible natures, when lacking a therapeutic purpose, may constitute torture 
or ill-treatment when enforced or administered without free and informed consent of the person 
concerned.”230 The IACtHR also stated that the procedure for name and legal sex change 
“cannot require supporting evidence of total or partial surgery, hormonal therapy, sterilisation, 
or bodily changes in order to grant the request or to prove the gender identity in question 
because this could be contrary to the right to personal integrity recognised in Article 5(1) and 
5(2) [right to humane treatment].”231 Therefore, when a medical procedure is necessary for 
LGR, there is no free consent because the consequences of refusing treatment amount to 
CIDT.  Due to space constraints, the following analysis not exhaustive as it does not touch upon 
all the prohibitive requirements that give rise to CIDT. This section will first analyse sterilisation 
requirements, second, other medical requirements and compulsory medical examinations, and 
finally it will analyse administrative and judicial requirements.  
 
i. Sterilisation Requirement 
Many countries require trans people to undergo permanent bodily modifications in 
order to obtain LGR. Some states specifically require trans people to be unable to procreate in 
order to change their legal gender, while other states only have a general requirement to have 
undergone a surgery.232 When the requirement of ‘surgery’ is framed in a general manner, it is 
usually understood as requiring permanent sterilisation. Despite society’s misunderstanding 
about the subject, there is no such a thing as a single ‘sex change/reassignment surgery’ that 
symbolises a person’s transition or changes one’s sex.233 Such belief is entrenched in the 
misunderstanding that gender is biologically determined, and leads to the coercion of trans 
people to medically useless surgeries that may be unwanted.  
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Coercive sterilisation gives rise to both mental and physical suffering. Such procedure 
involves one or more invasive surgeries to trans people’s genitals and reproductive organs. It 
therefore entails severe physical pain. The severe mental distress comes from the imposition 
of a coercive medical procedure and invasion of a person’s physical and moral integrity.234  
The sterilisation requirement is also used by some countries to purposefully hinder trans 
people’s access to LGR. As an example of sterilisation purposefully hindering LGR,  Singapore, 
allows gender transitions after sterilising surgery, but such surgery has not been offered by a 
single Singaporean hospital since 2003.235 This requirement therefore adds a further economic 
burden on trans people seeking LGR. Furthermore, while sexual and reproductive rights are 
often not considered when evaluating the consequences of coercive sterilisation for trans 
people, it is important to note that trans people may want to have biological children. In such 
cases, coercive sterilisation would destroy their life plans.236 
In the past thirty years, human rights bodies have progressively found violations of the 
right to be free from torture and CIDT in situations that were previously not under the scope of 
its prohibition. These include rape, domestic violence, sterilisation, female genital mutilation 
and corporal punishment of children.237  The definition of which violations fall under CIDT is 
therefore not a fixed one, but may vary in time.238 As seen in chapter two of this paper, UNCAT, 
IACtHR, the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the Independent Expert on SOGI have agreed 
that the requirement of sterilisation constitutes a violation of the right to be free from CIDT. Such 
argument has been developed by human rights bodies in relation to women’s rights, and was 
applied to trans people only in a second moment. The ECtHR and the HRC , have only found 
that coercive sterilisation of trans people constitutes a violation of the right to private life.239 
Referring to women’s rights, the HRC stated that in order to assess the compliance with the 
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prohibition of torture and CIDT, “State parties should also provide the Committee with 
information on measures to prevent forced abortion and forced sterilisation.”240 When 
encountering the issue of coerced sterilisation of trans people in concluding observations on 
several states, the HRC recognised it only as a violation of the right to private life.241 The HRC 
therefore adopted a double standard and failed to recognise trans people’s right to humane 
treatment and bodily integrity.  
In S.V. v. Slovakia, the ECtHR stated that “In order for treatment to be ‘inhuman’ or 
‘degrading’, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond the inevitable 
element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment.”242 It 
further states that sterilisation constitutes a major interference with a person’s reproductive 
health status, and therefore the forced sterilisation of a Roma woman constituted a violation of 
the right to be free from torture and CIDT.243 In A.P., Garcon and Nicot v. France, a case 
concerning the requirement to undergo sterilisation against one’s will to obtain LGR, the ECtHR 
only found a violation of the right to private life.244 Therefore, ECtHR also adopted a double 
standard when analysing a case concerning trans people. Both the impossibility of obtaining 
LGR and coercive sterilisation constitute CIDT. As a consequence, the imposition of a 
sterilisation requirement must constitute CIDT. and human rights bodies should recognise this 
issue in the future.  
 
ii. Other Medical Requirements  
In addition to sterilisation, there are two main medical requirements that violate the right 
to be free from CIDT. The first, is the requirement to obtain a psychiatric diagnosis proving that 
one has gender identity disorder. The second, is the requirement to have undergone irreversible 
changes as a result of hormonal replacement therapy.245 As previously stated, when a law 
requires trans people to undergo medical treatments to obtain LGR, it violates the principle of 
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autonomy and integrity because they are coercive.246 The severity of the harm procured by 
coercive medical requirements that do not involve sterilisation is underestimated by human 
rights bodies. Harm and suffering inflicted to trans people is often underestimated by domestic 
and international courts. The arguments to define coerced sterilisation as CIDT has already 
been argued by the women’s rights movement and therefore does not involve an evaluation of 
the severity of the suffering imposed on trans people. When considering the coercive nature of 
other medical treatments imposed solely on trans people, most human rights bodies did not 
find a violation. In few situations, human rights bodies found that coercive medical treatments 
for trans people violate human rights law. UNCAT in its concluding observations, required Hong 
Kong to remove abusive preconditions for legal gender recognition so as to respect trans 
people’s autonomy and psychological integrity. 247 The recommendation may be interpreted as 
including not only sterilisation, but also other medical procedure and psychiatric diagnosis 
process, since coerced psychiatric diagnosis and hormonal replacement therapy should be 
considered to be abusive conditions.248 CEDAW opposed the pathologising model in the 
observations of Slovakia, stating that “when transgender and intersex women seek to change 
their legally recognised gender, they are required to undergo medical treatment, which does 
not respect the freedom to control one’s body.”249 The Committee then urged the State party to 
change the legal framework in order to protect transgender and intersex women from non-
consensual medical treatment.250  
The ECtHR, while it recognised the harm provided by the coerced sterilisation to some 
extent, and classified it as a violation of the right to private life, failed to recognise the harm 
provided by the requirement of psychiatric diagnosis and other medical treatments.251 Indeed, 
the ECtHR stated that the requirement to undergo a psychiatric diagnosis did not affect a 
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person’s physical integrity.252 In that analysis the Court failed to mention one’s psychological 
integrity, and endorsed the pathologising model sanctioned by the WHO. 
 
- Psychiatric diagnosis 
Legal and medical transitions should be accessible to trans people and based on  
informed consent system, rather than on a mental illness diagnosis.253 The legal requirement 
of a psychiatric diagnosis violates trans people’s rights for two main issues. First, it violates 
trans people’s moral integrity because it is coerced upon them. Any coercive medical treatment 
that is not necessary to save a person’s life violates the right to personal and bodily integrity 
under the right to be free from CIDT.  The psychiatric diagnosis requirement has not even been 
considered a violation of the right to privacy by most human rights bodies. Second, it humiliates 
trans people because it entails that one’s gender identity is a pathology. A psychiatric diagnosis 
counts as a medical treatment to which a person must to provide consent. The Council of 
Europe’s bioethics committee recognised that gender identity disorder diagnosis should never 
constitute a justification for imposing involuntary medical treatment.254 Without free consent, 
the requirement to submit oneself to a coercive psychiatric diagnosis, constitutes a coerced 
medical treatment, and therefore violates the right to be free from CIDT. As stated by the 
Special Rapporteur on Health, patients have to give free and informed consent even for 
medically necessary treatments, unless the patient is unconscious and the situation life-
threatening.255 Human rights bodies have furthermore established that even coercive 
treatments that are not physically irreversible may reach the threshold of mental suffering 
required to be considered CIDT under human rights law.256 The fact that the treatment does not 
have a physical element shall not impede the classification of the treatment as CIDT, since all 
the prohibitions of torture and CIDT include mental suffering. When considering if a treatment 
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constitutes CIDT, elements such as the long-term impact on a victim’s physical and 
psychological well-being and effects on their ability to pursue life goals must be considered.257   
At the moment of writing, the vast majority of States continue to require a psychiatric 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria in order to allow legal gender recognition.258  Only in the most 
extreme situations the psychiatric requirement has been considered a violation of CIDT. The 
HRC in its concluding observation on Ukraine stated that “any medical treatment should be 
provided in the best interest of the individual and with his/her consent, should be limited to those 
medical procedures that are strictly necessary […] and that abusive or disproportionate 
requirements for legal recognition of a gender reassignment are repealed.”259 In Ukraine trans 
people are interned in a psychiatric institution for up to 45 days in order to obtain the diagnosis 
required to access medical transition and LGR.260  
The severity of harm caused by coerced psychiatric diagnoses is still not fully 
understood by human rights institutions. The HRC’s concluding observation on states that ‘just’ 
require a coercive psychiatric diagnosis, usually do not find a violation of CIDT or even the right 
to private life.261 The ECtHR, in A.P. , Garcon and Nicot also did not find a violation of the right 
to be free from CIDT or the right to private life when analysing the requirement to undergo 
medical treatments not amounting to sterilisation, to obtain LGR.262 The IACtHR in its Advisory 
Opinion has stated that the requirement of a psychiatric diagnosis would violate a person’s 
moral integrity as protected by the right to be free from CIDT. 
The diagnosis requirement entails that trans people are mentally ill and has both 
stigmatising and dehumanising effects on trans people.263 The psychiatric diagnosis defines 
one’s identity as a pathology. For a treatment to be degrading, IHRL requires such treatment 
to force a person to act against his or her own will or to be grossly humiliated.264 The ECtHR 
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requires a person to have undergone in their eyes or in the eyes of others humiliation or 
debasement attaining a minimum level of severity.265 Having one’s own identity defined as a 
pathology that is classified as a ‘disorder of personality and behaviour’ by the ICD-10266 
alongside issues such as pathological gambling, pathological fire-setting, kleptomania, 
fetishism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, sadomasochism and paedophilia, is deeply humiliating for 
trans people and it encourages stigma and discrimination.267 
The requirement to have a psychiatric diagnosis is not only a violation of one’s moral 
integrity, but also leads to further human rights violations of trans people. Many states  require 
trans people to accept a mental illness diagnosis to access medical transition.268 The diagnosis 
therefore works as a gatekeeping force. As a result of this process, trans people’s access to 
both basic and trans-specific healthcare is hindered.269 Lack of access to medical transition has 
adverse effects on trans people’s well-being.  Furthermore, in several countries, the 
requirements for the diagnosis is not properly regulated, and gender recognition becomes at 
the discretion of individual specialists.270  In other countries the process is unduly lengthy and 
intentionally humiliating. For example, in Serbia trans people have to come out and be 
examined by panels of doctors several times before even granting access to medical 
transition.271 Access to basic healthcare is hindered by the diagnosis requirements. Lack of 
understanding of trans people’s medical needs and overall marginalisation created by lack of 
access to medical and legal transition hinder trans people’s access to basic medical services, 
given the gatekeeping system in place.272  
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- Hormonal Replacement Therapy  
Some states require trans people to have undergone irreversible changes as a result 
of hormonal replacement therapy to obtain LGR.273 The decision to undertake a gender 
transition is motivated by one’s desire to affirm one’s gender identity. Gender transition is not a 
singular event, but rather a social, medical and legal process that unfolds over time.274 Trans 
people may want to undergo only some gender affirming treatments or no medical treatment, 
and this should not prevent them from being recognised before the law. Most trans people want 
to undergo hormonal replacement therapy in order to align their gender identity with their 
appearance. However, if this is not a free choice based on informed consent, but a coerced 
choice, it does constitute CIDT. The full severity of psychological suffering of being coerced to 
undergo a medical treatment, must be considered by human rights bodies even when it entails 
supporting the auto-determination of trans people. The same reasoning used in sterilisation 
cases, based on the inviolability of one’s bodily integrity and the consequences of such 
violation, should be adopted also in trans-specific cases not involving sterilisation. When the 
requirement consists of hormonal replacement therapy, the same reasoning concerning 
coercion should continue to apply. 
 
iii. Compulsory Medical Examinations 
As a part of the pathologising model, courts often need to obtain proof that the medical 
requirements have been fulfilled, and therefore mandate specific medical examinations. Such 
examinations cannot be considered voluntary. In A.P., Garcon and Nicot v. France, one of the 
applicants claimed that the court mandated medical (genital) examinations to prove that she 
had been sterilised, breached her moral and physical integrity. The ECtHR did not find any 
violation of either the right to private life or the right to be free from CIDT.275  The coercive 
element of the court-mandated exam was not analysed. Coercive medical examinations for the 
purpose of LGR, can be compared to body searches. When conducted in a disproportionate, 
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humiliating or discriminatory manner, body searches may amount to CIDT.276  In X. and Y. v. 
Argentina, a woman and her daughter had to undergo invasive vaginal searches as a condition 
to visit their husband and father in prison. The IACHR argued that this type of search may be 
legal only if absolutely necessary, proportionate and carried out in a humane manner.277 The 
search was not absolutely necessary and inevitable, and violated the right to be free from 
CIDT.278  
The ECtHR also stated that non strictly necessary invasive body searches constitute 
CIDT.279 In X and Y. v. Argentina, the applicants were not forced to submit to an invasive body 
search, but this was a precondition to visit a family member in a prison. Similarly, trans people 
are not forced to submit themselves to unnecessary and invasive medical exams, but this is a 
precondition towards LGR. Coercive genital medical examination can be equated with invasive 
body searches also in their severity and mental health harm. It has been recognised multiple 
times that trans individuals are particularly vulnerable in situations that involve body 
searches.280  Trans people are also particularly vulnerable in medical settings, since “for many 
trans people the discrepancy between gender identity and/or expression and the body can lead 
to difficulties when accessing healthcare services.”281 Trans people are also more vulnerable 
to coercive genital examinations for several reasons. Discrimination against trans people in 
healthcare settings is extremely common.282 An extremely elevated number of trans people are 
physically and sexually attacked, or threatened with sexual violence.283 In states where 
homosexuality is criminalised, men suspected of same-sex sexual activity, are subjected to 
non-consensual anal examination intended to obtain physical evidence of homosexuality.284 
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The UNCAT has stated that such practice is medically worthless and constitutes torture or 
CIDT, given its humiliating nature.285 The same reasoning should be applied to coercive medical 
treatment for trans people. When trans people are coerced to undergo medical exams to prove 
whether they have undergone a sterilising procedure or to determine whether one’s genitals 
match their gender identity their right to bodily integrity is violated. Considering the personal 
vulnerabilities, the fact that the procedure is not medically necessary, it includes examination 
of one’s genitals, and is coercive, it can be concluded that such examination may amount to 
CIDT.  
iv. Administrative and Judicial requirements 
This section first analyses legal requirements such as coerced divorce, and secondly 
it analyses the legal and administrative processes of LGR. In order to access legal gender 
recognition, States impose administrative and legal requirements in addition to the medical 
ones. Some of these conditions violate trans people’s psychological integrity and cumulatively 
contribute CIDT. The most common administrative prohibitive requirement concerns marriage. 
In the vast majority of countries, trans people are required to be unmarried or to divorce in order 
to change legal gender.286 This requirement is imposed also in states that do recognise same 
sex marriage or civil partnership.287 In G. v. Australia, the applicant was forced to divorce from 
her wife in order to legally transition, even though same-sex marriage was recognised at the 
time in Australia.288 The requirement was therefore solely discriminatory. The Special 
Rapporteur on Torture on this point, argued that forcing a person to divorce in order to obtain 
LGR, may destroy their life goals.289 Being forced to divorce undermines trans people’s right to 
be recognised before the law as an equal citizen.290 Forced divorce provokes severe mental 
suffering has a high emotional and economic cost, to both the trans person and their spouse.291 
Even though this requirement may not provoke a mental suffering so severe to constitute CIDT 
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if taken individually, cumulatively with other medical and/or administrative requirements they 
reaches the threshold of CIDT requirements for mental suffering.  
Secondly, the legal process of changing one’s documents may be structured in a way 
in which it leads to mental suffering amounting to a violation of CIDT. Some legal processes 
purposefully ostracise trans people. Poland, is an extreme case, and has a system in place in 
which trans people have to sue their parents for having assigned them the wrong gender at 
birth, after having undergone sterilisation.292 Many other countries do not go to such lengths, 
but require trans people to undergo lengthy judicial and administrative processes in order to 
change their legal gender.293 In countries such as in Lithuania and Singapore, the State allows 
legal transition to people who have undergone sterilisation, but fails to provide such surgeries, 
rendering transition de facto inaccessible.294  
Where the state has a pathologising policy, administrative and judicial processes 
require the presentation of medical evidence to the authorities responsible to approve the 
change. The result of such policies, often coupled with pathologisation, is that trans people are 
unable to be recognised before the law in a timely manner. If the permanent non-recognition of 
a person before the law constitutes CIDT, then also prolonged non-recognition provokes the 
same mental suffering and leads to a violation of the right to be free from CIDT. In S.V. v. Italy, 
the ECtHR stated that non-recognition of a trans person more than two and a half years after 
being acknowledged as a trans person by the state, constituted a violation of the right to private 
life. In Sweden, while the legal framework is seemingly respectful of trans people’s moral 
autonomy, the waiting times to access trans-specific healthcare and legal gender recognition 
are purposefully long, as a gatekeeping mechanism. 295 
However, as previously explained, the consequences of not having one’s gender identity 
recognised by the law are so grave to constitute cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment.  
 
Conclusion 
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Network, 2018 
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In the past thirty years, the adjudication of trans rights under the right to private life has 
allowed the pathologising model to thrive and further violate trans people’s rights. However, 
trans people’s moral and physical integrity are severely violated by restrictive and pathologising 
laws and policies. The analysis of human rights bodies’ case law through a gender-sensitive 
approach has led to the conclusion that laws and policies violating trans people’s moral and 
physical integrity, violate their right to be free from CIDT. 
The prohibition to obtain LGR amounts to ill-treatment for two main reasons.  First, not 
having the possibility of being equally recognised before the law severely violates a person’s 
moral integrity. As stated by the IACtHR, the lack of recognition before the law negates a 
person’s dignity because it denies his condition as a subject of rights.  Secondly, non-
recognition before the law gives rise to a number of other human rights violations, including 
freedom of movement, ill-treatment in detention, right to health, social security and adequate 
standards of living. The severe violation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
has such effects that the non-recognition of one’s gender violated the right to be free from CIDT. 
Trans people without matching documents are even more exposed to ill-treatment when in a 
detention setting. This paper has also analysed how, when a State requires medical treatments 
as a condition for LGR, it de facto coerces trans people to undergo such treatments and 
therefore violate the right to be free from CIDT. Human rights bodies have previously stated 
that coercive medical treatments constitute CIDT, and coerced sterilisation has been widely 
recognised as constituting CIDT. However, due to the gendered nature of human rights law, 
trans-specific coercive medical treatments, have been justified by the pathologisation and not 
recognised as constituting CIDT. In addition, lengthy judicial processes and other administrative 
requirements may, alone or cumulatively, constitute degrading treatment. Such processes 
unduly extend the amount of time trans people have to endure while not being recognised 
before the law. To conclude, human right bodies should depart from the endorsement of 
pathologisation of trans identities, and recognise the harm inflicted on trans people by States 
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